Seyyed Abbas Hussaini/ The visit today (April 19) of “Muhammad Ishaq Dar”, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan, to Kabul is not only the first official visit at the level of the Foreign Ministry by the Islamabad government to Afghanistan under the rule of the Islamic Emirate in the past three years, but also one of the most significant recent diplomatic moves in South Asia. Previously, in 2021, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Foreign Minister of the Imran Khan government, had visited Kabul. This visit followed recent exchanges between the two countries including the visit of Pakistan’s Special Representative, Muhammad Sadiq, and the Afghan trade delegation – and has emerged as a wave of “unexpected diplomatic traffic” in the tense relations between the two neighbors.
Publish dateSaturday 19 April 2025 - 14:44
Story Code : 313233
From Constant Tension to Expedient Interaction: Tracing the Roots of the Crisis
Since the Islamic Emirate took control of Afghanistan in Asad 1400, the Pakistani government, which was initially known as one of the long-standing supporters of this movement, gradually turned into a staunch opponent. This divergence was not due to ideological reasons, but rather to a conflict of security and regional interests. The most important knot of this disagreement is the issue of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
Pakistan accused the Islamic Emirate government of sheltering, arming, and providing intelligence support to TTP members; an accusation that has always been strongly denied. However, the increase in TTP armed activities in the tribal areas and Balochistan of Pakistan over the past year has gradually led policymakers in Islamabad to conclude that the Islamic Emirate is either unable to control this group or is using its existence as a strategic tool, while the reality is different and the country, seeking a projection, has always tried to shift the burden of its failure to provide security and achieve peace with disgruntled domestic militants onto Afghanistan and the Islamic Emirate.
Pakistan's Triple Pressure Strategy: From Customs to Refugees and ISIS
In response to these projections, the Shahbaz Sharif government resorted to three major tools to exert pressure:
1. Economic and customs sanctions: In a targeted move, Pakistan reduced trade with Afghanistan, sharply increased customs tariffs, and even temporarily closed key crossings such as "Torkham" and "Chaman". This approach not only disrupted the daily lives of the Afghan people, but also severely limited Pakistan’s economic opportunities.
2. Refugee-centric security policy: Islamabad implemented a massive deportation of Afghan refugees with the aim of creating psychological and social leverage against the Islamic Emirate. This move symbolically conveyed the message that Pakistan’s internal security was more important than humanitarian or historical considerations regarding refugees.
3. Playing with the enemy of the enemy: There were reports that Pakistani intelligence agencies had been tacitly engaging with elements of the ISIS-Khorasan Branch (ISKP). This move reflected an aggressive balancing policy against the Islamic Emirate, especially considering ISIS’s deep ideological hostility to the Islamic Emirate.
But why did Pakistan back down?
Despite these pressures, Pakistan not only failed to achieve its goals, but also faced three structural realities that forced a policy shift:
1. The endless security crisis inside
The TTP and the Baloch separatists not only did not weaken, but also increased their attacks on Pakistani soil, a fact that indicated that the challenge was more rooted in the country, and that Pakistan needed to find a solution other than military means. While continued instability threatens the political and security legitimacy of the Islamabad government, using the Islamic Emirate’s capacity to mediate with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and assist in the country’s peace process would be an important and effective choice for Islamabad.
2. Economic and geographical blockade
The closure of the borders with Afghanistan effectively stopped Pakistan’s transit flow to Central Asia. At a time when China is advancing with its “Belt and Road” initiative and India is advancing with maritime and land trade routes, this isolation turned Pakistan from a potential player in regional trade to a marginal actor. On the other hand, the sharp decline in bilateral trade has hurt the economies of both countries, especially Pakistan, and forced Afghanistan to substitute other routes, including Iranian ports and railway routes, for this country.
3. The Islamic Emirate’s move towards New Delhi
On the other hand, the Islamic Emirate was exploring ways to establish better relations with India. For Pakistan, any degree of proximity between Kabul and New Delhi means the opening of a strategic front on its western border; and that too in a situation where its relations with India remain hostile. The past year witnessed serious and positive movements towards improving relations between Afghanistan and India and normalizing relations, which has certainly been worrying for Pakistan.
Today’s trip: tactical turn or test of sustainable diplomacy?
Given the above background, Mohammad Ishaq Dar’s trip to Kabul today is a sign of a kind of political realism in Islamabad. This move may be purely tactical; To open communication channels, calm the atmosphere and redefine the levers of pressure.
In fact, Islamabad has now realized that the Islamic Emirate, contrary to previous expectations, is not just a "pivot" as some opponents claim, but rather an independent actor seeking to consolidate its interests and create new regional balances.
Conclusion and the Future Outlook
The current diplomatic traffic between Afghanistan and Pakistan reflects a phase shift in the logic of bilateral relations: from “pressure and denial” to “engagement and crisis management”.
The success of this new path depends on several key components:
- Acceptance of mutual security realities, including distinguishing the TTP from the Afghan Taliban, and using the Islamic Emirate’s capacity for reconciliation in Pakistan
- Redefining common economic interests, especially in the areas of transit and energy
- Avoiding proxy games with extremist groups or political opponents
If this path continues with mutual understanding and strategic planning, we may witness the birth of a “new regional order based on the balance of interests”; although there is still a long way to go before it is realized.
Since the Islamic Emirate took control of Afghanistan in Asad 1400, the Pakistani government, which was initially known as one of the long-standing supporters of this movement, gradually turned into a staunch opponent. This divergence was not due to ideological reasons, but rather to a conflict of security and regional interests. The most important knot of this disagreement is the issue of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
Pakistan accused the Islamic Emirate government of sheltering, arming, and providing intelligence support to TTP members; an accusation that has always been strongly denied. However, the increase in TTP armed activities in the tribal areas and Balochistan of Pakistan over the past year has gradually led policymakers in Islamabad to conclude that the Islamic Emirate is either unable to control this group or is using its existence as a strategic tool, while the reality is different and the country, seeking a projection, has always tried to shift the burden of its failure to provide security and achieve peace with disgruntled domestic militants onto Afghanistan and the Islamic Emirate.
Pakistan's Triple Pressure Strategy: From Customs to Refugees and ISIS
In response to these projections, the Shahbaz Sharif government resorted to three major tools to exert pressure:
1. Economic and customs sanctions: In a targeted move, Pakistan reduced trade with Afghanistan, sharply increased customs tariffs, and even temporarily closed key crossings such as "Torkham" and "Chaman". This approach not only disrupted the daily lives of the Afghan people, but also severely limited Pakistan’s economic opportunities.
2. Refugee-centric security policy: Islamabad implemented a massive deportation of Afghan refugees with the aim of creating psychological and social leverage against the Islamic Emirate. This move symbolically conveyed the message that Pakistan’s internal security was more important than humanitarian or historical considerations regarding refugees.
3. Playing with the enemy of the enemy: There were reports that Pakistani intelligence agencies had been tacitly engaging with elements of the ISIS-Khorasan Branch (ISKP). This move reflected an aggressive balancing policy against the Islamic Emirate, especially considering ISIS’s deep ideological hostility to the Islamic Emirate.
But why did Pakistan back down?
Despite these pressures, Pakistan not only failed to achieve its goals, but also faced three structural realities that forced a policy shift:
1. The endless security crisis inside
The TTP and the Baloch separatists not only did not weaken, but also increased their attacks on Pakistani soil, a fact that indicated that the challenge was more rooted in the country, and that Pakistan needed to find a solution other than military means. While continued instability threatens the political and security legitimacy of the Islamabad government, using the Islamic Emirate’s capacity to mediate with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and assist in the country’s peace process would be an important and effective choice for Islamabad.
2. Economic and geographical blockade
The closure of the borders with Afghanistan effectively stopped Pakistan’s transit flow to Central Asia. At a time when China is advancing with its “Belt and Road” initiative and India is advancing with maritime and land trade routes, this isolation turned Pakistan from a potential player in regional trade to a marginal actor. On the other hand, the sharp decline in bilateral trade has hurt the economies of both countries, especially Pakistan, and forced Afghanistan to substitute other routes, including Iranian ports and railway routes, for this country.
3. The Islamic Emirate’s move towards New Delhi
On the other hand, the Islamic Emirate was exploring ways to establish better relations with India. For Pakistan, any degree of proximity between Kabul and New Delhi means the opening of a strategic front on its western border; and that too in a situation where its relations with India remain hostile. The past year witnessed serious and positive movements towards improving relations between Afghanistan and India and normalizing relations, which has certainly been worrying for Pakistan.
Today’s trip: tactical turn or test of sustainable diplomacy?
Given the above background, Mohammad Ishaq Dar’s trip to Kabul today is a sign of a kind of political realism in Islamabad. This move may be purely tactical; To open communication channels, calm the atmosphere and redefine the levers of pressure.
In fact, Islamabad has now realized that the Islamic Emirate, contrary to previous expectations, is not just a "pivot" as some opponents claim, but rather an independent actor seeking to consolidate its interests and create new regional balances.
Conclusion and the Future Outlook
The current diplomatic traffic between Afghanistan and Pakistan reflects a phase shift in the logic of bilateral relations: from “pressure and denial” to “engagement and crisis management”.
The success of this new path depends on several key components:
- Acceptance of mutual security realities, including distinguishing the TTP from the Afghan Taliban, and using the Islamic Emirate’s capacity for reconciliation in Pakistan
- Redefining common economic interests, especially in the areas of transit and energy
- Avoiding proxy games with extremist groups or political opponents
If this path continues with mutual understanding and strategic planning, we may witness the birth of a “new regional order based on the balance of interests”; although there is still a long way to go before it is realized.
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