Crisis in the Israeli regime's intelligence and terrorist operations think tank

Afghan Voice Agency (AVA) - International Service: The Israeli army's Unit 8200, which is considered the largest military intelligence and espionage unit of the occupying regime and is known as the regime's intelligence and terrorist operations think tank, has suffered major blows since the beginning of the Battle of Al-Aqsa Storm on October 7, 2023, and after its elite officers failed to predict this Palestinian resistance operation, has suffered major blows and has been one of the most important centers targeted by Hezbollah operations.
In this context, the American website Axios published a report yesterday, referring to the unprecedented crisis in this Israeli spy and military center, and quoted former intelligence officers of the regime as saying: The Israeli army's Unit 8200 has witnessed the worst crisis in its history after the failure on October 7.
According to three former senior officers of Unit 8200, the unit needs a fundamental intelligence task that many of its members do not know how to do and without this task, they will repeat their failure.
These Zionist officers, whose names were not mentioned, said that the appointment of "Uri Stav" as the new commander of Unit 8200 is a memorial to the failure that led to the failure of October 7 and that this appointment is an insufficient step to reform and repair Unit 8200.
One of the former senior intelligence officers of the Israeli regime stated in this regard: The new commander of Unit 8200 failed to stop the process of stupidity that led to the disaster.
The Axios website added: Three former Israeli military intelligence officers agree that although Ori Stav held technical positions within Unit 8200, he is not an intelligence man. He was also the former deputy commander of the unit for three years and thus played a role in the decisions and mistakes that led to the failure of October 7, while Unit 8200 needs an intelligence commander more than anything today.
Unit 8200 is one of the largest units of the Israeli military intelligence agency, established in the mid-20th century, and its purpose is to intercept and decode in order to provide information and warnings to the Central Command and the General Staff of the Israeli army.
This unit is considered the largest unit of the military intelligence department of the occupying regime, which is responsible for collecting key information and developing intelligence collection tools, continuously updating them, analyzing and processing data, and providing information to relevant authorities. It carries out its work from inside war zones.
Unit 8200 is based primarily on technical development and then cyber, with the aim of achieving information superiority at all levels of the Israeli security system, both military and political.
According to Tasnim, Unit 8200 has many listening centers in northern and southern Palestine. Listening to wired and wireless communication devices is one of the most important missions of Unit 8200. Fixed and mobile phones and wireless systems are constantly listened to by this unit. This approach enables the unit to fully carry out its mission. Unit 8200's eavesdropping operations are not limited to Palestine and neighboring countries, but also include other countries that may be geographically distant from the occupied territories.
Despite all the facilities and technologies available to Unit 8200 and its long history in intelligence and espionage programs, it was unable to predict Operation Al-Aqsa Storm and was severely surprised after this operation, where the Al-Qassam Forces were able to attack the Urim military base in the Negev, which is under the management of Unit 8200, and kill a large number of soldiers present at the base.
Information also indicates that Hamas forces took away sensitive information files and valuable devices in the base; without causing any harm to themselves and returning safely.
The Hebrew newspaper Jerusalem Post reported that the commanders of Unit 8200 were unable to justify the intelligence scandal of October 7, indicating a major security-intelligence gap in the unit. According to the report, the commanders of Unit 8200 held a long meeting on October 8, the day after Operation Storm al-Aqsa, and then the meeting ended with intense tension and disagreement among them and without any specific conclusions, and everyone tried to blame each other for the failure.