Abdul Qadir, a farmer in the fertile Shomali region north of Kabul, grows grapes much the same way his father and grandfather did. He tends his vines close to the ground, crams clusters into big plastic sacks, drives them 25 miles to the capital and sells them from his car for about $3 a bag.
Abdul Qudoos, a grower and trader from the same district, has abandoned such old-fashioned ways. He ties his vines to cement trellises, chills grapes in a cold storage facility, packs them in imported boxes and ships them by container to India and Dubai. This year, he was able to invest $200000 in his expanding fruit business.
Qudoos,38, made that leap with support from a U.S.-funded agricultural marketing program that American officials call a small but exceptional success in a decade of economic assistance.
The project has already endured difficulties ranging from Taliban attacks to resistance from farmers. But now, it may face its biggest challenge of all. With most U.S. military scheduled to withdraw by next year, and an uncertain presidential election looming in April, it must soon be turned over to Afghan hands.
And that raises the question of whether the ambitious program will produce more thriving farmers like Qudoos, or will wither on the vine.
“I risked my money and I sent my grapes beyond Pakistan, farther than my family had ever done. Most people aren’t willing to do that,” said Qudoos, proudly holding up an imported packing box with his company name and colorful fruit logo. “I took some loss at first, but now I am making 30 per cent more than we ever did before.”
For several years, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has worked to help small Afghan farmers shift from traditional local crops, such as wheat, into high-value exports.
Improved grapes and nuts, they point out, can also out-earn opium poppies, which find eager buyers in the drug trade.
The grape program has faced an array of obstacles unique to Afghanistan, such as land mines left in vineyards from years of war and threats from Taliban insurgents. It has also required participants to imagine a different way of life and to take financial risks for a promise of long-term gain — qualities that are still rare in this traditional, rural society.
Like all USAID programs, the grape project must be turned over to Afghans, in part because of U.S. transition policy and in part because of new requirements from international donors that 50 per cent of every aid program be budgeted through the Afghan government.
William Hammink, the USAID director in Kabul, said the agency “will remain a close development partner with Afghanistan for years to come,” but that “a major part of our transition is to ensure that everything we do is Afghan-led, with Afghan ownership and commitment to sustainability.” He called the farm marketing program an “exciting example of what is possible in the future.”
Much of the expertise and field training has been provided — with USAID support — by a California-based non-profit called Roots of Peace, which has worked in Afghanistan for a decade and prepared local managers to carry on its work. But as foreign financial and technical assistance shrink, there are concerns that Afghan officials and private partners may be unable or unwilling to adapt.
(Washington Post)
Abdul Qudoos, a grower and trader from the same district, has abandoned such old-fashioned ways. He ties his vines to cement trellises, chills grapes in a cold storage facility, packs them in imported boxes and ships them by container to India and Dubai. This year, he was able to invest $200000 in his expanding fruit business.
Qudoos,38, made that leap with support from a U.S.-funded agricultural marketing program that American officials call a small but exceptional success in a decade of economic assistance.
The project has already endured difficulties ranging from Taliban attacks to resistance from farmers. But now, it may face its biggest challenge of all. With most U.S. military scheduled to withdraw by next year, and an uncertain presidential election looming in April, it must soon be turned over to Afghan hands.
And that raises the question of whether the ambitious program will produce more thriving farmers like Qudoos, or will wither on the vine.
“I risked my money and I sent my grapes beyond Pakistan, farther than my family had ever done. Most people aren’t willing to do that,” said Qudoos, proudly holding up an imported packing box with his company name and colorful fruit logo. “I took some loss at first, but now I am making 30 per cent more than we ever did before.”
For several years, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has worked to help small Afghan farmers shift from traditional local crops, such as wheat, into high-value exports.
Improved grapes and nuts, they point out, can also out-earn opium poppies, which find eager buyers in the drug trade.
The grape program has faced an array of obstacles unique to Afghanistan, such as land mines left in vineyards from years of war and threats from Taliban insurgents. It has also required participants to imagine a different way of life and to take financial risks for a promise of long-term gain — qualities that are still rare in this traditional, rural society.
Like all USAID programs, the grape project must be turned over to Afghans, in part because of U.S. transition policy and in part because of new requirements from international donors that 50 per cent of every aid program be budgeted through the Afghan government.
William Hammink, the USAID director in Kabul, said the agency “will remain a close development partner with Afghanistan for years to come,” but that “a major part of our transition is to ensure that everything we do is Afghan-led, with Afghan ownership and commitment to sustainability.” He called the farm marketing program an “exciting example of what is possible in the future.”
Much of the expertise and field training has been provided — with USAID support — by a California-based non-profit called Roots of Peace, which has worked in Afghanistan for a decade and prepared local managers to carry on its work. But as foreign financial and technical assistance shrink, there are concerns that Afghan officials and private partners may be unable or unwilling to adapt.
(Washington Post)
Source : Afghan Voice Agency (AVA), International Service
